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ABSTRACT: Karen Barad’s Agential Realism provides a non-paradoxical realist account of 
quantum reality, but does not show how the complex picture that it implies can be applied to 
the familiar physics of the laboratory. Here, motivated by parallels with the way human 
cultures evolve, the theory is augmented by the inclusion of evolutionary processes.  The 
outcome is the understanding that organised activity at deeper levels can result in the 
emergence of entities such as universes, and phenomena in these universes, including possibly 
life and the evolution of life.  It is argued that agential realism is not essentially new to science, 
differing from the kinds of ordered structures familiar in physics mainly through the role played 
by the semiotic, or interpretive information-processing, aspects of the theory. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper discusses a proposal that might be called ‘a structural theory of 
everything’, very different in character to conventional theories based upon 
quantum mechanics.  It is an extension of Barad’s ‘agential realism’ (1), which 
attempted to demystify quantum mechanics, and which might be characterised 
as a description of the ‘machinery of nature’. This approach is consistent with 
Kastner’s ‘possibilist’ interpretation of quantum mechanics (2).  The extension 
of agential realism discussed here involves taking account of the evolutionary 
potential of the ‘discursive practices’ that play an essential role in Barad’s 
picture, which potential is akin to the potential that ordinary discourse has in 
regard to representing and making use of discoveries.  In an equivalent way, 
evolving representations created at deeper levels of reality provide mechanisms 
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for the emergence of the ordinary laws of physics, and also, in part, specific 
phenomena governed by these laws, thereby providing a basis for Wheeler’s 
conjecture that ‘observer-participation’ can be ‘the foundation of everything’ 
(3).  The phenomena to which such mechanisms are relevant include the origin 
of life and, more controversially, the possibility that aspects of the evolution of 
species may be influenced from a deeper level. 
STATISTICAL VS. REALIST MODELS OF THE QUANTUM DOMAIN 
As noted in (4), physicists dealt with the unpredictability that seems to be an 
inherent feature of the quantum realm by espousing theories capable of 
predicting averages with a high degree of accuracy, but this may lead to the 
neglect of significant characteristics of individual instances of a phenomenon.  
Quantum mechanics has chosen to be blind as regards what may be happening 
in individual cases, concern being much more with the production of all-
inclusive models.  While this strategy has undeniably been the source of 
remarkable successes, it is also proving problematic at the present time, in part 
as it has led to a situation where there is limited contact between theory and 
experiment, something that is an essential requirement for producing theories 
with wide-ranging predictive power. 
Realist models, by way of contrast to the above, do focus on individual 
instances.  An early realist model was Bohm’s hidden variable picture, 
depending for its success on the introduction of a non-local quantum potential 
with unusual characteristics.  It was motivated chiefly by the wish to reproduce 
accurately the predictions of quantum theory.  The theories invoked in the 
current paper have a different motivation, namely the wish to produce a 
picture that makes intuitive sense, the hope being that some future 
development of the ideas may in addition disclose how the quantitative aspects 
of nature arise.  The present paper takes steps towards fulfilling that goal. 
INDETERMINACY 
Barad’s agential realism, an attempt to make sense of the quantum domain in 
realist terms, is a development of ideas due to Niels Bohr.  Bohr argued that 
details of the quantum domain are in general not merely uncertain, a reference 
to mere ignorance of the details, but indefinite or indeterminate, in the sense that 
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treating values of variables as definite can lead to contradictions.  For example, 
when a beam of light is split into two by a beam splitter and combined in such 
a way as to give rise to an observable interference pattern, we may be inclined 
to ask which path was taken by an individual detected photon.  But 
determining which path a given photon takes, using a suitably placed photon 
detector, would prevent interference, implying that the question of which path 
a particular photon took has no clear answer. 
This leads to a curious ambivalence as to what ‘really happens’.  The fact 
that photons can be detected would suggest that it makes sense to ask where a 
given photon is, but that would seem to preclude the possibility of the photon 
acting like a wave, as seems to be dictated by the fact that interference 
indicative of waves can be demonstrated. Clearly, the quantum domain cannot 
be pictured in the same way that classical reality can. 
Bohr addressed this conundrum by arguing that despite reality in the 
quantum domain being indeterminate, that indeterminacy is only partial.  We 
can in certain circumstances say that an electron is a particle, and in others that 
it is a wave, though never that is it both.  The context determines what can 
definitely be said, and the fact that a measurement has taken place, whatever 
the outcome, is one circumstance where something definite can be said. 
Barad generalises this analysis by invoking agencies that are the source of 
observable phenomena.  Note that while observable phenomena have a concrete 
reality, the same cannot necessarily be said of agencies, which term is in general 
an abstraction, with a utility in speaking of nature.  The possible abstract 
character of agencies is illustrated by the example of vibrations in classical 
physics: we may legitimately say that a vibration was the cause of some 
particular damage, but the question of what was vibrating has no precise 
answer, since in general no sharp boundary can be drawn between what is 
vibrating and what is not.  This indefiniteness does not however detract from 
the utility of speaking of agencies and, where possible, modelling their 
behaviour. 
The fact that measuring instruments, or more generally agencies whatever 
they may be, are able to make definite what was previously indefinite, means 
that they are a special kind of system, and the question arises as to why 
particular systems should possess this characteristic.  This introduces a new 
concept, that of discursive practice.  Measuring instruments can initially produce 
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unreliable readings and are in need of refinement, which refinement is 
governed by some notion of what is the quantity being measured.  In general, 
design makes use of an understanding of the dependence of the performance 
on a range of factors, which understanding can typically be expressed in verbal 
form. One may infer that processes of the character of discourse are crucial for 
accurate measurement to be possible. 
Barad proposes that measurement in the laboratory, resulting in it being 
possible to make definite assertions regarding a quantum object, has to be 
viewed merely as a special case of a more general phenomenon associated with 
causing some aspects of nature to become definite.  This generalisation consists 
in the assertion that agencies are present in nature that typically act in 
cooperation with each other, producing specific phenomena describable as the 
performance associated with such collections of agencies, which performance is in 
large part consequent upon organisational information exchange having the character of  
discourse, a point to which we shall return. 
ENTANGLEMENT AND MEANING 
At this point entanglement of a generalised kind enters the picture.  Any 
process that causes something to become definite can be viewed as a unit, 
where a number of agential processes work together to produce some specific 
result.  This unit involves a number of agencies, interacting with each other in 
very specific ways determined by the fact that their coordinated activities 
produce the outcome associated with the unit.  Barad gives such interactions 
the name intra-actions, to symbolise the fact that they happen within some unit, 
and have a special ability to cooperate.  Systems are described as entangled 
when they are in such a cooperating situation. 
The concept of meaning arises naturally in this picture, since cooperation is 
enhanced by anticipation, through which actions can take account of what is 
likely to happen.  Anticipation, as discussed in the semiotic theories of Peirce 
(5), involves a process of interpreting signs in a context dependent way. 
Peirce’s account of meaning, consistent with that of Barad, differs from the 
version that assigns a specific meaning to a given sign, in that a sign may 
usefully refer to something different in different contexts.  Signs are used 
pragmatically, being related to the options available in a given situation.  This 
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adaptability of signs considerably enhances their utility. 
AGENTIAL CUTS 
Agential realism involves a mechanism referred to as the agential cut, a process 
that complements entanglement; whereas entanglement joins two or more 
systems together, a cut splits one system into two.  This is what happens during 
measurement: before it is known what the outcome of the measurement is we 
have an entangled state, but after the measurement the observer and the object 
of observation can be considered separate. 
A point needs to be made in this connection.  In accord with Bohr’s dictum 
that science is about what can be said about nature, in this picture concepts 
such as entanglement and cut are merely idealisations, abstractions.  Nature is 
inaccessible in its totality, and we have to make do instead with such 
idealisations as fall within the scope of language. 
DISCURSIVE PRACTICES 
Consistent with this pragmatic view is Barad’s concept of discursive practices. 
 Signs may have reference, but mere referentiality is of no value: it is how signs 
are used that matters.  The processes of sign usage are referred to as discursive 
practices.  This usage of signs involves their systematic transmission to other 
systems and the corresponding system responses, in order that the organised 
activity that results should generate the desired collective behaviour.  Feedback 
from the outcome of this organised activity can be used to modify the discursive 
activity that generates it so as to enhance the outcome.  Discursive activity, in 
this way, plays the role of a powerful tool that can be used in a variety of 
situations.  Furthermore, the overall corpus of discursive activity can itself 
evolve, which idea will form the basis of our account of the connection between 
the agential realism hypothesis and the physics of the laboratory. 
FAMILIAR ANALOGUES TO AGENTIAL REALISM 
Agential realism, logical though it may be, might seem to be implausible by 
virtue of the complex intertwinings that are involved, were it not for the fact 
that it closely mirrors what happens both in biological systems and in human 
activity.  It must accordingly be considered a tenable hypothesis (later, it will be 
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argued that phenomena of the character of agential reality may arise naturally 
in situations where information has very specific consequences). 
Taking the analogy seriously requires consideration of the ways in which 
agential realism and these analogues differ.  Chemistry is an essential 
component of the hardware in the case of biological systems in general, while 
neural networks are in the case of human activity.  But, as with computation, 
the hardware is not necessarily important. What is essential for agential realism 
to apply is a variety of features, such as structures that can be sensitive to 
specific signals and process information in specific ways, and can be subject to 
systematic modification by incoming signals.  We take it that such features are 
supported in the situation of current interest. 
Another perspective on the situation is the following.  Physics is familiar 
with situations where order arises spontaneously.  In the systems commonly 
studied by physicists, the order involved can be characterised in comparatively 
simple terms and, in contrast to the situation being considered here, are most 
often static in character.  However, activity can present even in equilibrium in 
the form of fluctuations, which concept may be imported into the theory. 
 What agential realism and its analogues may be telling us is that a more 
complicated kind of order, which is also dynamic, is equally possible, and may 
be prevalent in complex systems. Failure to recognise this order in physical 
systems may simply be a consequence of the wrong kind of focus (4). 
EVOLUTIONARY AGENTIAL REALISM 
Barad’s primary goal was to derive a realistic account of quantum reality. Our 
aim is now to show how, when evolutionary processes are taken into account, 
agential realism can be linked to phenomena such the emergence of universes 
such as ours with its specific physical laws, as well as processes occurring within 
such universes. 
We discuss first evolutionary mechanisms within the supposedly analogous 
situation of human culture. This can be characterised as the co-evolution of 
discursive and other practices, which mutually adapt to each other.  The search 
for novelty can lead to new practices, associated with modifications of 
discourse, in some cases utilising the existing sign system but, where 
appropriate, involving an extension of the existing sign system, for example by 
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the invention of new words with the capacity to evoke new possibilities.  Over 
time, radical advances occur in a culture through such mechanisms.  Invoking 
the analogy, we argue that similar evolution can occur at our hypothesised 
deeper level, with the outcome being the production of universes, and processes 
occurring within these universes, through a rough equivalent to modern 
technology, it being rather as if some advanced civilisation had come into 
existence, as a result of organisational activity at the deeper level, and had 
developed its own version of our technology. 
The details can be related to the concerns within a culture, which gradually 
change over time.  Applying the same concepts to agential realism at a 
fundamental level has to take account of the fact that ‘concerns’ at such a level 
are, initially at any rate, very different from human concerns.  These initial 
concerns must be related to the survival of any agencies that exist, as will 
involve some kind of primordial understanding of the environment, and of 
action within that environment.  Evolution will involve what can be considered 
to be advances in such understanding, on the basis of the discovery of new 
possibilities, a process similar to cognitive development in humans.  In essence, 
what is involved is the discovery, description and manipulation of patterns.  The 
use of appropriate language can have the consequence of many agencies 
working together to create larger scale patterns, something that has its 
equivalent in human societies. 
The question then arises as to which choices would be made, in this kind of 
scenario, out of a multitude of possibilities.  A relevant possibility lies in the way 
discourse works.  It may in particular involve the abstraction goodness, and 
concepts related to goodness, tying such concepts to valuations of  overall outcomes. 
 Preferences relating to goodness would ultimately lead to particular outcomes 
being favoured. 
AGENTIAL REALISM AND HUMAN CAPACITIES 
The picture described above entails in addition the possibility of entanglement 
between processes in humans, and processes at the fundamental level.  This 
may account for certain human capacities, including those relating to 
mathematics and music, it being difficult to see how the intuitive aspects of 
such capacities could develop in a refined form, in the limited time available for 
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human beings to acquire them.  At the fundamental level, however, there is 
infinite time for the appropriate mechanisms to evolve, so entanglement with 
human nervous systems could lead to humans having contact with these 
mechanisms, thereby being able to make use of their implicit capacities.  Music 
at the fundamental level might for example function as a symbolic system (cf. 
ref. 6), while mathematical capacities might emerge as a natural concomitant to 
processes dealing with patterns. 
LINKS WITH THE POSSIBILIST INTERPRETATION OF QUANTUM 
MECHANICS 
Agential Realism permits a reinterpretation of Ruth Kastner’s possibilist 
interpretation of quantum mechanics (2), in accord with which the collapse of 
the wave function associated with observation is interpreted as the outcome of a 
transaction with a possibility, which outcome makes something definite, in the 
same way as in the present analysis.  Possibilities are things that can be 
considered real, but are not necessarily actualized, which process Kastner 
equates with existing ‘within the observable spacetime theater’.  In this 
connection, Kastner and Barad both regard space-time as a structure that is 
created, not pre-existing. 
The two views of reality can be reconciled by noting that the transactions of 
the possibilist interpretation are the equivalent of the discursive practices of 
agential realism, while the possibilities of the possibilist interpretation are also a 
part of discursive practice. 
AGENTIAL REALISM FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF PHYSICS 
The kind of organisation proposed by Barad to account for the unusual 
characteristics of the quantum domain has been connected above with the kind 
of organisation found in human activity.  In this section we discuss this order in 
more general terms, involving concepts similar to those developed in the 
context of biological systems in general by Hankey (private communication). 
Physics is familiar with kinds of order such as ferromagnetism, where in the 
vicinity of a particular temperature some characteristic begins to propagate 
over large distances.  This can be understood in terms of a positive feedback 
mechanism, whereby local changes affect the surroundings in a way that feeds 
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back so as to reinforce the original change, giving rise to an instability.  With 
agential realism there is similar mutual reinforcement, resulting from intra-
actions within groups of cooperating agencies.  Differential reinforcement helps 
to determine which entities and practices are found in reality. 
In a sense, then, agential realism is nothing new.  What differs from the 
kinds of order familiar in physics is in part the complexity, but besides this there 
is the ‘entanglement of matter and meaning’ discussed by Barad.  Once it 
becomes possible for specific information (for example signs) to relate to specific 
objects, as implied by Peirce’s semiotic ideas, everything changes. 
That specificity can be attributed to the existence of specific structures that 
process information in specific ways.  These structures are themselves organised 
by other structures, consequent upon the way discourse can rearrange the 
entities that it relates to.  Thus nature discovers certain possibilities of self-
consistent mutual organisation, and then extends and modifies them in 
dramatic ways. 
CONCLUSIONS 
There are some parallels between the present situation and what prevailed at 
the time when the atomic theory was being developed.  The latter also 
provided a picture in terms of a hypothesised deeper reality capable of 
accounting, in simple terms, for a number of known phenomena that were, at 
that time, characterised in purely mathematical terms, with no underlying 
model.  Taking the hypothesised deeper reality seriously led to considerable 
advances in science.  Here, we are dealing with agencies that do more then 
collide with each other as the atoms of the atomic theory did (or, in the 
chemical context, bond with each other according to specified rules, so as to 
make molecules).  In the present approach, these agencies are presumed to 
have internal structures, enabling them to interact meaningfully with each 
other on the basis of appropriate processing of information, so as to produce 
the observed phenomena. 
It was argued in the final section that ‘meaningful interaction’ is the main 
factor making the hypothesised order involved in agentive realism different 
from the kinds of order that are familiar in physical systems.  If this is the case 
(and future research should be able to clarify this issue through the use of 
appropriate models), there would be the extraordinary implication (cf. ref. 2) 
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that developments in fundamental physics have been seriously limited through 
the view, largely accepted in mainstream physics, that the unpredictability that 
is characteristic of the quantum domain means that we should not think about 
what reality may lie beneath the surface.  Barad, side-stepping this general 
belief, ingeniously followed through Bohr’s analyses of quantum indeterminism 
to show that, for consistency, we are almost forced to a view of reality involving 
entangled agencies, interacting meaningfully as noted above.  In this way, 
meaning has suddenly re-entered the picture, in a place where it had been 
assumed it would be absent. 
The idea that meaning should not be mentioned in a scientific argument 
seems to be a one held fervently by many scientists, perhaps as a consequence 
of Monod’s influential book Chance and Necessity (7). But disciplines such as 
language would be seriously handicapped were it not possible there to talk 
about meaning, and since language is a natural phenomenon it would seem 
irrational to insist in its exclusion elsewhere in science.  Rather, the criterion for 
using the concept should be purely its utility in the situation at hand, and in 
Barad’s picture of reality it plays a key part in discussing the role of discursive 
practices. 
What should one conclude from this?  Perhaps that dogmas such as those of 
Monod have no place in science, and can have a seriously inhibiting effect on 
its development.  Freed from this constraint, we will encounter a whole new 
world to explore, integrating mental processing gracefully with the rest of 
science. 
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